

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 00415

EXDIS

USSALT TWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 12, 1978
(SALT TWO-1564)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
EARLE AT SALT TWO MEETING OF JANUARY 12, 1978:

- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR EARLE
- JANUARY 12, 1978

MR. MINISTER:

- I

THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NEW AGREEMENT
WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 1974, THE UNITED STATES HAS
GIVEN PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO THE ISSUE OF MIRV VERIFICATION
MIRV VERIFICATION REQUIRES SPECIAL ATTENTION, BOTH BECAUSE
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIRV LIMITATIONS AS A SIGNIFICANT
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STEP TOWARD THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN VERIFYING
SUCH QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS.

THE SIDES HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE
QUESTION OF MIRV VERIFICATION OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, AND
THIS PROGRESS IS REFLECTED IN AGREED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT

DRAFT TEXT. TODAY I WILL ADDRESS TWO ASPECTS OF THE MIRV VERIFICATION QUESTION WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED.

- II

THE FIRST ASPECT DEALS WITH THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A PARTICULAR MIRVED MISSILE AND A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER. THIS ASSOCIATION IS NECESSARY BECAUSE IT IS LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED ICBMS AND SLBMS, RATHER THAN THE MISSILES THEMSELVES, WHICH WILL BE LIMITED BY THE TREATY.

THE SIDES ARE AGREED THAT THE LAUNCHERS TO BE DEFINED AS MIRV LAUNCHERS WILL INCLUDE THOSE LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING MIRVED MISSILES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT IN ADDITION THE SIDES AGREE UPON TWO CRITERIA WHICH, IF EITHER IS MET, WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR CONSIDERING A LAUNCHER TO BE A MIRV LAUNCHER. SPECIFICALLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT IF A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES A MIRVED MISSILE, THAT LAUNCHER WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING MIRVED MISSILES.

ALL ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR LOCATION OR THEIR FUNCTION, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THESE CRITERIA. THESE CRITERIA WOULD APPLY TO LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES, LAUNCHERS IN DEPLOYMENT AREAS, AND LAUNCHERS ON BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES. THEY WOULD APPLY TO TEST AND SECRET

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TRAINING LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE PART OF THE OPERATIONAL FORCES. HOWEVER, I WANT TO NOTE THAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ALL SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE APPROPRIATE AGGREGATE NUMBERS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE V. THE SIDES HAVE AGREED IN ARTICLE VII THAT THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY, AND THUS ALSO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE V, SHALL NOT APPLY TO ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS - THAT IS, ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS USED ONLY FOR TESTING OR TRAINING, WHEREVER LOCATED. ACCORDINGLY, THE "CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES" CRITERIA PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT RESULT IN THE INCLUSION OF TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS IN THE AGGREGATES.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE "CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES" CONCEPT REPRESENTS OBJECTIVE, FACTUAL CRITERIA FOR ASSOCIATING A MISSILE WITH A LAUNCHER. THE LAUNCHING OF A MIRVED ICBM OR SLBM FROM A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THAT LAUNCHER HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A MIRVED ICBM OR SLBM. ON THIS I BELIEVE THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US. WITH RESPECT TO THE "CONTAINS" CRITERION, I WOULD NOTE THE FOLLOWING.

IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN ALL CASES TO ASSOCIATE A MIRVED
MISSILE WITH ITS LAUNCHER BY MEANS OF THE "LAUNCHES"

CRITERION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF SLBMS, THE MISSILES
IN THEIR TEST PROGRAM ARE INITIALLY LAUNCHED FROM LAND-
BASED LAUNCHERS, WHICH ARE DIFFERENT IN APPEARANCE FROM
THE LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES. THE LAUNCHES FROM THE LAUNCH-
ERS ON SUBMARINES OCCUR WHEN THE SUBMARINES ARE SUBMERGED,

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AND THEREFORE THESE LAUNCHES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION
BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HOWEVER, ASSOCIATIONS CAN BE
MADE THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS BETWEEN MIRVED SLBMS
AND THEIR LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES BY MEANS OF THE "CONTAINS"
CRITERION. IT IS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS THESE
THAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL INCLUDES THE WORD "CONTAINS"
AS WELL AS THE WORD "LAUNCHES."

FINALLY, I WOULD NOTE THAT THERE IS NO REASON WHY A
LAUNCHER WHICH CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES A MIRVED MISSILE
SHOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THAT MISSILE. IN FACT, TO
CONSIDER A LAUNCHER THAT CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES A MIRVED
MISSILE TO BE OTHER THAN A MIRV LAUNCHER WOULD BE CONTRARY
TO REASON, AND WOULD BE CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATIONS
MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.
THUS IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES TO AGREE UPON THE

"CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES" CRITERIA.

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I NOW WANT TO TURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER WHICH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A MIRV LAUNCHER AND OTHER LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE. THE SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT IF A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER IS A MIRV LAUNCHER, THEN ALL LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE MIRV LAUNCHERS AND THEREFORE WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE APPROPRIATE AGGREGATE NUMBERS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE V, EXCEPT FOR TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS.

HOWEVER, A QUESTION EXISTS REGARDING THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TWO PARTICULAR LAUNCHERS ARE OF THE SAME TYPE OR ARE OF TWO DIFFERENT TYPES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED THAT, "LAUNCHERS OF ONE TYPE ARE ALL SUCH LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS." THIS LANGUAGE IS UNCLEAR. IT COULD MEAN THAT EACH LAUNCHER WOULD BE ASSESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON THE BASIS OF THE MISSILE FOR WHICH THAT PARTICULAR LAUNCHER HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD UNDERMINE THE AGREED CONCEPT FOR THE LAUNCHER TYPE RULE. IF EACH LAUNCHER MUST BE INDIVIDUALLY EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF THE MISSILE FOR WHICH THAT PARTICULAR LAUNCHER HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING, THE LAUNCHER TYPE RULE ITSELF WOULD BE OF NO BENEFIT TO VERIFICATION.

IN ANY CASE, APPLICATION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IN CONCLUSIONS REGARDING TYPE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE VERIFICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IF TWO LAUNCHERS WERE DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A PARTICULAR TYPE OF MISSILE, THEY WOULD BE
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CONSIDERED TO BE LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE, EVEN IF THEY WERE MARKEDLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS - FOR INSTANCE, IF ONE WERE A SOFT LAUNCHER AND ONE WERE A SILO LAUNCHER. SUCH A CONCLUSION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE THE COMMON INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "LAUNCHER TYPE." IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT THE UNITED

STATES BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL DEFINING
"LAUNCHERS OF ONE TYPE" SHOULD BE DELETED.

- IV

MR. MINISTER, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE "CONTAINS OR
LAUNCHES" CRITERIA PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AND
WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINITION OF
"LAUNCHERS OF ONE TYPE" WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD
RESOLUTION OF THE MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE. I LOOK FORWARD
TO YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE QUESTIONS. EARLE

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